Comments

What Effect Should State Law Have in
Defining "Personal Injury" Damages for
Purposes of I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2)

Exclusion?
In Roemer v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit turned to California law to locate the meaning of "'personalinjury" as used in
section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. This Comment
analyzes that court's decision and compares the use of state law
within the tax code with its use in certain other federal statutory
schemes. Although state law can be useful and perhaps accurate
in decipheringCongressionalintent, this Comment considers a key
policy behind the tax code-namely uniformity-and concludes
that the sole use of state law in defining terms within the tax code
is incompatible with the congressional object.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States federal income tax is embodied in title 26 of
the United States Code.' The courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) utilize a broad definition of income;2 most realized accessions to wealth are presumed to be taxable income, unless the
taxpayer can demonstrate that an exclusion or deferral applies.'
1. This Comment focuses on the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C.
(1991) [hereinafter the Code].
2. "[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . ." I.R.C.

§ 61(a) (1991). The authority to tax individual income derives from the 16th Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
3. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1955) (holding

Congress has legislated such an exclusion in section 104(a)(2) of the

Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)4 and has excluded damages received

on account of personal injuries from taxable income.5 This code section has presented many interpretative problems for the courts, the
IRS, and taxpayers alike. This Comment will focus on only one of
these problems, namely the definition of "personal injury" damages
by resorting to state tort law classifications. The earliest predecessor
of section 104(a)(2), 6 section 213(b)(6), 7 was passed by Congress in
1918 and provided for the exclusion of damages from income. 8 At
that time, it was questioned whether Congress believed tort damages
were income. 9 The legislative history of section 213(b)(6) 10 suggests
that Congress was inconclusive about classifying damages as income." Nonetheless, the exclusion was codified, and the Supreme
Court subsequently concluded that punitive damages in a business
context are income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.'2
Personal injuries have been held to include both physical and nonphysical injuries.' 3 In 1989, Congress amended section 104(a) and
declared that the exclusion "shall not apply to any punitive damages
in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness."' 4 Notwithstanding the amendment, numerous tax cases
have involved questions of nonphysical injuries,' 5 and compensatory
damages for nonphysical injuries remain viable for section 104(a)(2)
punitive damages were income).
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991). "[G]ross income does not include . . . (2) the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness . .. ."
5. Id. See infra notes 268-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons for this exclusion.
6. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991).
7. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919).
8. Id. Gross income does not include "[a]mounts received ... as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or
agreement on account of such injuries or sickness." Id. For a comprehensive history, see
Stuart M. Schabes, Comment, Roemer v. Commissioner, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 211
(1983).
9. See Daniel C. Knickerbocker, Jr., The Income Tax Treatment of Damages:A
Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 429, 431 (1961-62).
10. See supra note 7.
11. H.R. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918), reprintedin 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
86, 92 (doubtful that amounts received for personal injuries or sickness are required to
be included in gross income).
12. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
13. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), revd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983); Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972).
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a),
103 Stat. 2379 (1989).
15. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), revd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th
Cir. 1983); Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983); Thompson v. Commissioner,
89 T.C. 632 (1987), affid, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88
T.C. 834 (1987), afd without published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Bent v.
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exclusion."6 This area of nonphysical injuries has plagued the courts
with difficulties in defining "personal injury."' 17 "[N]either the Code
nor the regulations explain what a taxpayer must show in order to
prove that he has received damages 'on account of personal injuries.' "18 The courts have addressed this problem by focusing on the
nature of the underlying claim. 9
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit adopted an approach in Roemer v.
Commissioner20 that resolved this definitional problem by turning to
state law." The effects of this approach are
yet to be felt; however,
22
at least one case has utilized this method.
This Comment will question the Roemer rationale2 3 by inquiring
into the theories behind the tax code exclusion, the inherent necessities of turning to state law in some situations, and the potential for
abuse and national inconsistencies that could result from following
the Ninth Circuit's approach.2 4 This Comment will show that the
sole use of state law to define "personal injury" is questionable and
inconsistent with federal tax exclusion policy.

Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510 (1989).
16. The 1989 amendment only addressed the issue of punitive damages for nonphysical injuries. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 36 (1972).
19. See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) (the question to be asked is "In lieu of what were the
damges awarded?"); Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1943) (recoveries of lost profits are income and not
excludible); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961) (basic reason for
payment); Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965) (actual reason
for making payment); Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972) (depends on nature
of the claim); United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 1979) (must derive
from some sort of tort claim); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 119 (1981) (depends
on nature of the claim); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297 (1986) (must
look to the origin and character of the claim).
20. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 697.
22. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affid, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988). See also Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330, rev'd, 914 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
1990) (Maryland law should be considered; punitive damages not excludible); Rickel v.
Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1990). See infra note 77.
23. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 317-35 and accompanying text.

II.

WHAT Is "PERSONAL INJURY?"

As noted above,2 5 "personal injury" definition has presented
problems for the Tax Court. Most courts addressing the issue have
concluded that the inquiry must focus on the nature of the claim.2,
Since "personal injury" is not defined in the Code, courts exercise
discretion in addressing the problem. However, the IRS and28 the
courts have not agreed on how this definition should be made.
29
Three recent cases have addressed this definitional issue, two of
them utilizing state tort law in their analyses. 30 The IRS has also
taken a position, 31 one that conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer. 2 A discussion of these cases and the IRS's position will introduce this unsettled area of federal income tax law.
A.

Roemer v. Commissioner

In 1952, Paul F. Roemer started his own insurance business in
Oakland, California. 33 "By the mid-1960's, he enjoyed an excellent
personal and professional reputation in the community."34 In 1965,
Roemer decided to apply for an agency license from Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Company, which subsequently requested a credit report from Retail Credit.3 The credit report was grossly defamatory,
and a purported retraction contained further defamatory remarks.36
Roemer was denied agency licenses from Penn Mutual and other insurance companies, and his general reputation in the community
suffered.
Roemer brought suit in a California court for libel under section
45 of the California Civil Code.38 Under section 45, "[1]ibel is a
false and unprivileged publication by writing [or] printing ... which

exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
25. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 4, 18 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
29. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983); Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1982); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
30. Roemner, 716 F.2d at 693; Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1294.
31. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
33. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 694.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 694-95.
36. Id. at 695.
37. Id.
38. Id. See Schabes, supra note 8, at 215 (discussing the procedural history of the
defamation suit).
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to injure him in his occupation." 9 Roemer alleged that the defamatory report was done "with intent to damage his reputation, and to
injure him in his business profession and occupation." 4 The jury
awarded Roemer $40,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages. 41 The jury was not asked to specify whether the
damages were for injury to Roemer's personal or professional reputation and did not allocate the award between personal and business
loss. 42
On his 1975 federal tax return, Roemer reported $16,020 of the
damages as income. 43 The Commissioner of the IRS determined that
the entire award was gross income, less a deduction for costs and
attorney fees. 4 The Tax Court with three dissenting judges upheld
the Commissioner's determination, concluding that 1) the compensatory damages were not excludible because Roemer failed to establish
they were for injury to his personal reputation, and 2) the punitive
damages were includable in gross income.4 5 In reaching its decision,
the Tax Court majority found the conclusive factor in determining
when an award was for personal injury was the nature of the claim
settled.46 The Tax Court concluded that the damages represented
compensation for lost income. 7 The court focused on the allegations
contained in the pleadings, along with the issues and evidence
presented at trial.48 The majority concluded that the nature of Roemer's claims involved damages to his professional reputation as an
insurance broker. 49 In 1983,50 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed.
The Ninth Circuit maintained that the Tax Court confused "a
personal injury with its consequences and illogically distinguishe[d]
' The Ninth Circuit
physical from nonphysical personal injuries."51
held that "[t]he relevant distinction that should be made is between
39.
40.
41.
(1975).
42.
43.
that the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
716 F.2d at 695.
See Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82
716 F.2d at 695.
Id. How Roemer arrived at this figure is unclear, and Roemer later admitted
amount was incorrect. 79 T.C. 398, 404 (1982).
716 F.2d at 695.
79 T.C. at 407-08.
Id. at 405. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79 T.C. at 406.
Id.
Id.
716 F.2d at 695.
Id. at 697.

personal and nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical injuries. ' 2 In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit turned to the text
of section 104(a)(2)13 and applied an "ordinary meaning" analysis to
the term "personal injury." 4
6 and Raytheon Production
Citing Woodward v. Commissioner"
56
Corp. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit said it must look to the
nature of the tort of defamation to determine whether the exclusion
applied. 57 In determining the underlying nature of the claim, the
court declared that it "must look to state law." 8 The court proceeded to discuss California's legislative history of defamation and
concluded that since the tort of defamation appeared under the California Civil Code at "Division 1. Persons. Part 2. Personal Rights.,"
the code recognizes a personal right to be protected from defamation.59 The Ninth Circuit further recognized that California law provides for the related torts of disparagement or trade libel, these
being seen as business injuries. ° Realizing that an attack such as
Roemer sustained could affect both personal and business character,
the Ninth Circuit stated that Roemer had a choice of actions in California.61 The court went on to hold that since defamation of an individual is a personal injury under California law, the compensatory
damages were excludible from gross income under section
104(a)(2).62 The court also held that the punitive damages were
excludible.63

52. Id.
53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
54. 716 F.2d at 697.
55. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
56. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 779 (1944).
57. 716 F.2d at 697.
58. Id. "Since there is no general federal common law of torts nor controlling definitions in the tax code, we must look to state law to analyze the nature of the claim
litigated." Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932)) (other citation omitted).
59. 716 F.2d at 697-99. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 43-46 (West 1982).
"[E]very person has ... the right of protection from ... defamation .... ." CAL Civ.
CODE § 43 (West 1982). Under section 44, "[d]efamation is effected by either of the
following: (a) Libel. (b) Slander." CAL. CIv. CODE § 44 (West 1982).
60. 716 F.2d at 699. See Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. 2d 537, 541, 134 P.2d 217,
220 (1943) (utilizing Restatement of Torts section 624 for slander of title); Erlich v.
Etner, 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (1964) (defining trade libel as
"an intentional disparagement of the quality of property, which results in pecuniary
damage" by resorting to Restatement of Torts sections 626 and 627); Shores v, Chip
Steak Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 627, 630, 279 P.2d 595, 597 (1955) ("The distinction between libel and trade libel is that the former concerns the person or reputation of plaintiff and the latter relates to his goods.").
61. 716 F.2d at 699.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Id. Since section 104(a) has been amended, this Comment will not address the
punitive damages holding. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive analysis of Roemer v. Commissioner,see Schabes, supra note 8.
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B.

Church v. Commissioner

Prior to the Ninth Circuit's reversal in Roemer,64 the Tax Court
confronted a factually similar situation in Church v. Commissioner6 5 There, the Attorney General of Arizona had received a jury
award of $250,000 compensatory and $235,000 punitive damages in
a defamation suit brought against a Phoenix newspaper. 6 The Tax
Court distinguished Roemer 67 and held the $250,000 compensatory
damages excludible from gross income.6 Though the results of
Church69 and Roemer70 are consistent, the analyses applied by the
Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court varied considerably.7 1
C. Subsequent IRS Reaction
1. Revenue Ruling 85-143
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer, 2 the Commissioner announced in Revenue Ruling 85-143 that the IRS would
not follow the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Roemer.7 3
The IRS rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach because the nature of
the libel, not the definition of libel under state law, should determine
whether the libel produced a personal injury.7 4
That announcement by itself may not persuade a court. 75 Courts
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
80 T.C. 1104 (1982).
Id. at 1104-05. The newspaper had labelled Church as a communist. Id.
Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.

1983).
68. 80 T.C. at 1108-09 (declaring that Roemer said little about how the credit
report hurt him personally, while the entire thrust of Church's case presentation was
personal effects of being labelled a communist).
69. 80 T.C. at 1104.
70. 716 F.2d at 693.
71. The Ninth Circuit focused on the nature of the claim and utilized California's
state law "label," whereas the Tax Court in Church seems to have focused on the effects
of the defamation as presented, something condemned by the Ninth Circuit. See infra
note 100 and accompanying text.
72. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
73. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.

74. Id. at 56.
75. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965) (stating that Revenue
Rulings do not have the force of law). A Revenue Ruling is not entitled to the deference
accorded a statute or treasury regulation. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294
(1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d
833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986). But cf. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (stating
that Revenue Rulings may be helpful in interpreting the law).

may "disregard a Ruling if [it] conflicts with the statute it supposedly interprets or with that statute's legislative history or if the Ruling is otherwise unreasonable." 6 However, if the Tax Court follows
Roemer," and the IRS insists upon Revenue Ruling 85-143,78 many
taxpayers will be inconvenienced by having to litigate their positions

in court.
2. Revenue Ruling 84-108
The Ninth Circuit in Roemer held that since the compensatory
damages were received on account of personal injuries, the punitive
damages were also excludible." 9 The court relied on the Commissioner's interpretation as declared in Revenue Ruling 75-45. 80 In

1984, the IRS in Revenue Ruling 84-108 changed its position and
held that punitive damages received in a wrongful death suit were
taxable.8 In 1985, the IRS strengthened its position in Revenue
Ruling 85-98.82

Burford v. United States83 dealt with the IRS's problematic position concerning Revenue Ruling 84-108.14 The Burford court held
that damages received for a wrongful death, though punitive in nature, were excludible under section 104(a)(2). 85 The court stated
that "[o]nly a contorted reading of Section 104(a)(2) could lead to
the interpretation that wrongful death proceeds are not received on

account of a personal injury."86 The IRS had taken the position that
since wrongful death actions in Alabama were characterized as puni87
tive, the damages so received were punitive and non-excludible. It
76. Brook, 799 F.2d at 836 n.4.
77. The Tax Court may be bound to follow Roemer under the Golsen Rule. See
Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57. (1970), affd on other grounds, 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). "[I]t is our best judgment that better
judicial administration. [sic] requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is
squarely in [sic] point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and
to that court alone." 54 T.C. at 757 (footnotes omitted).
78. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
79. 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983).
80. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Any damages received under section
104(a)(2), whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of personal injuries or
sickness are excludible from gross income. Id. at 48.
81. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. This conclusion was reached by referring to
a footnote in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955).
82. Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51, 52 (stating that the amount of a libel claim
settlement must be allocated into compensatory and punitive elements, with the punitive
damages not being exeludible).
83. 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that settlement proceeds received
under Alabama wrongful death act were received on account of personal injuries and
excludible).
84. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
85. 642 F. Supp. at 636.
86. Id. at 637.
87. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
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is interesting to note that the IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 8410888 and Revenue Ruling 85-143" 9 are inconsistent. With Revenue
Ruling 85-143, the IRS will disregard state law, but with Revenue
Ruling 84-108, the IRS relies heavily on state law even if inconsistent with the exclusion policy.9"
D.

Threlkeld v. Commissioner

In 1979, James Threlkeld filed a diversity action against J.B. Williams in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
for malicious prosecution. 1 Williams had contracted to purchase
real estate from Threlkeld and another and attempted unsuccessfully
to rescind the contract. 92 Threlkeld alleged that Williams' action
subjected him to "indignity, humiliation, inconvenience, and pain
and distress of mind . . .. prevented [him] from attending to his
injur[ed] his professional reputation,
usual professional pursuits, ....
and ... injur[ed] his credit reputation. 93a Threlkeld settled his malicious prosecution suit in 1980 for $300,000.1" Threlkeld excluded
most of the settlement from gross income on his 1980 tax return, and
the Commissioner assessed a deficiency, later conceding that all but
the $21,500 representing damages for injury to professional reputation was excludible.9 5 In 1986, the Tax Court, with one judge dissenting, held that there was no valid distinction between injury to
personal and professional reputation for purposes of section
104(a)(2). 96 The Tax Court held that, under Tennessee law, damages received in settlement of a malicious prosecution civil action
88. The IRS looks to the state wrongful death act classification for its classification
of punitive damages. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
89. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 268-92 and accompanying text on exclusion policy.
91. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affid, 848 F.2d 81, 81 (6th
Cir. 1988).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 82. The $300,000 was allocated as follows:
- $75,000 for damage to his professional reputation
- $75,000 for damage to his credit reputation
- $74,980 for indignity, humiliation, inconvenience, and pain and distress of
mind
- $20 for release of the fraudulent conveyance action claim
- $75,000 for the assignment of judgment by Threlkeld
Threlkeld received $86,000 in 1980 and the remaining $214,000 in 1981. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

were received on account of personal injuries. 97 The IRS appealed to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming the Tax Court erred.9 8
The Sixth Circuit noted that the Tax Court relied heavily on the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roemer.99 It also noted the Ninth Circuit's declaration that "nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury" are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of
injury, and that "the personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its effect." 100 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with Revenue
Ruling 85-14311 and, quoting Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 2 found

the ruling unreasonable.10 3 The Sixth Circuit held that the nature of
the underlying injury determines section 104(a)(2) excludibility and
concluded that in this case, the taxpayer's injury to reputation was
personal despite its effects on professional pursuits.104
By affirming the Tax Court, it appears the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the Roemer approach of defining personal injury.1 0 5 Yet, the
Tax Court had reservations about using the Roemer analysis and
discussed its shortcomings.106
These shortcomings, when combined with precedent holding
against state law "control" of words in a federal statute,10 7 suggest
that the Ninth Circuit's approach'0 8 is unique. As a starting point,
this Comment will first discuss the various precedents and introduce
analogous areas where state law is used. Then, after a brief discussion on exclusion policy, the analysis will proceed by applying two
separate approaches to the "use of state law" question. This Comment will demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer'019 is questionable and should be reconsidered.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 83.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
102. Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d. Cir. 1986).
103. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
106. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1306. Quoting the Tax Court:
State law may be of limited assistance where, in a settlement, the claim
settled is itself unclear. Similarly, State law is of little help where there are
several claims, only some of which are for personal injuries. The State law
classification ... will be of no assistance identifying the claim ...or in carving
up the damage recovery.
Id.
107. Estate of Steffke, 538 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022
(1976) (holding that federal law controls the meaning of words in federal revenue statute
in the absence of language evincing a different purpose).
108. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
109. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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III. STATE LAW EFFECTS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAX
A.

Guiding Principles

In one paragraph consisting of two sentences, the Ninth Circuit in

Roemer justified its sole reliance on state law."10 By relying on a
quote in Burnet v. Harmel,"' the Ninth Circuit proposed a novel

approach in dealing with the question: "What is a personal injury?"
Though this method was supported by the precedent quoted,"

2

its

invocation in terms of section 104(a)(2) exclusion was unpredicated." 3 The Ninth Circuit could have possibly warded off some
criticism" 4 by advocating its position more thoroughly, but its underlying proposition is dubious.
One need only look to the Burnet"' opinion itself to conclude the
Ninth Circuit was taking a big step. As stated in Burnet,
Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a statute
enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution, to tax income. The exertion of that power is not subject to state
control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its
will in legislation, in the absence of language evidencing a different purpose,
is to be interpreted 16so as to give a uniform application to a nationwide
scheme of taxation.

The Court further stated, "State law may control only when the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication, makes

its own operation dependent upon state law.""

7

In the case of per-

sonal injury damage exclusion under section 104(a)(2),"18 Congress

certainly did not expressly provide for state law control.

19

Whether

110. 716 F.2d at 697. "Since there is no general federal common law of torts nor
controlling definitions in the tax code, we must look to state law to analyze the nature of
the claim litigated. In order to determine the nature of Roemer's claim, we must analyze
the defamation action as it developed in state law." Id. (citations omitted).
I11. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (stating that state law creates
legal interests; federal law determines when and how to tax).
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Schabes, supra note 8, at 211 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's
resort to California law).
115. 287 U.S. at 103.
116. Id. at 110. See also Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 337 (1929); Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1925); United States v. Childs, 266
U.S. 304, 309 (1924).
117. Burnet, 287 U.S. at 110. See also Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930);
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); United States v. Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co.,
278 U.S. 55 (1928); Tyler v. United States, .281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930).
118. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991).
119. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991). "[G]ross income does not include .. .(2) any
damages received .. .on account of personal injuries or sickness .... Id. See supra

or not Congress by "necessary implication" made its taxing act "de20 is uncertain. The Ninth Circuit
pendent" upon state 12law'
appar1
ently believed it had.
The other problem with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is its
refusal to give credence to the command for "nationwide" uniformity. 2 Certainly, to the extent Congress intends uniform application
of section 104(a)(2), this intent is not repealed by any language contained in section 104(a)(2).' 2 ' In the absence of any such language
of differing purpose, the intent of Congress provides for nationwide

uniform application.. 24
The language relied upon does provide that "[t]he state law creates legal interests but the federal statute determines when and how

they shall be taxed.' 1 25 This suggests that state law will play a role

in certain circumstances, 2" but clearly provides that federal law determines "how they shall be taxed."'12 7 One need only consider the
issue in Roemer128 to conclude that the Ninth Circuit may have misused this text9 by utilizing state law to determine how the damages
12
were taxed.

Morgan v. Commissioner"30 sheds further light on the subject of

state created rights. There the Court stated,
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is
found in a given case that an interest or right created by local law was the
object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what
name is given to the interest or right by state law." 1

The Morgan decision, citing precedent,'

3

2

offers language which

note 18 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 110.
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
125. Id. See infra notes 131, 143 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text on property law applications.
127. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
128. 716 F.2d at 693. The issue was whether the damages received by the taxpayer
were excludible from income.
129. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text; see also Estate of Steffke,
538 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976) (federal law controls
the meaning of words in federal revenue statutes in the absence of language evincing a
different purpose).
130. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
131. Id. at 80-81. See also Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Bankers
Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308, 310 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S.
551, 555 (1933); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 659 (1937); Heiner v. Mellon, 304
U.S. 271, 279 (1938); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938).
132. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35
(1934); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1931); Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264
(1938).
310

LR.C. Section 104(a)(2)

[VOL. 29: 299. 1992]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

supports the Ninth Circuit's position by stating, "in the application

of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature
of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property or income sought to be reached by the statute."' 13 This statement, taken
in isolation, suggests that the Ninth Circuit ruled properly in Roe-

mer by turning to state law. 34 Yet, when combined with the lan-

guage in Burnet,'35 inconsistencies appear. I3 6 "[D]ifferences in state

law should not override the intent of Congress in enacting federal
taxing statutes."' 37 Congress's intent was to promote uniform appli-

cation of a nationwide scheme of taxation.'3 8 Yet, "Congress in
drafting the tax code clearly did not intend to redefine whole areas
of legal relationships created by state ... law, but instead sought to
impose a generally uniform system of taxation upon the existing le-

gal structure."'

39

Perhaps the confusion that results from analyzing the various

precedents arises because state law does play a primary role in many

federal tax cases. 4 0 Whether by necessity,' 4 ' Supreme Court deci-

sion, or congressional intent, state law has been involved in almost
all federal tax determinations.'
B.

Property Law in General

In terms of the federal income tax, state law usually controls in
determining the nature of the legal interest the taxpayer has in the
property sought to be taxed. 14 3 The state has a legitimate and tradi-

tional interest in creating and defining the property interest of its
133. 309 U.S. at 82.
134. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
136. The nature of the claim test advocated in Roemer derives from Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), and Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144
F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983).
137. In re Vaughan, 719 F.2d 196, 200 (6th Cir. 1983).
138. Scully v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1534, 1539 (C.D. Ill. 1986), af'd, 840
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 116, 124 and accompanying text.
139. Scully, 629 F. Supp. at 1539. See also Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S.
78, 80-81 (1940); Comment, The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determinations,72
HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1351 (1959).
140. See infra notes 143-252 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
142. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1350.
143. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960).

citizens. 4 In Aquilino v. United States,45 it was argued that property interest definitions should be governed by federal law. 14' The
Supreme Court disagreed stating, "[I]t ignores the long-established
role that the States have played in creating property interests and
places upon the courts the task of attempting to ascertain ...

erty rights under an undefined rule of federal law."' 47

prop-

As stated by the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 48 "with respect to . . . income, federal income tax liability follows ownership."' 4 9 When ownership is to be determined, state law controls. 8 0

"The state law creates legal interests but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed."'' Property law is state
law.' 52 State law usually determines who owns the property.1 3
The federal tax code "creates no property rights but merely at-

taches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state
law."' 5 4 "[O]nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the [taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [the
statute], state law is inoperative .... "1155
The Supreme Court has usually held that in matters of property
ownership, state law controls.' 56 However, a taxpayer who holds legal title to property under state law is not necessarily the owner for
purposes of the federal income tax. 57 The courts have carefully
scrutinized transactions involving mere title-passing.' 58 "[T]axation
is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with
actual command over the property taxed ....

..9 "The Court has

144. Id. at 514.
145. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 513, n.3.
147. Id.
148. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
149. Id. at 197. See also Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 11-14 (1937); Hoeper
v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
150. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 197.
151. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932)).
152. Drake v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 830, 832 (N.D. I11.1986).
153. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930)(community property issue in federal income tax context).
154. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
155. Id. at 56-57.
156. But cf Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (corporate tax case
stating that the economic realities of the transaction as a whole, not who has title under
state law, decides who are the owners for federal income tax purposes).
157. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (case involving
sale-leaseback). See also Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258, 263 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
158. See Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
transfer of shopping center stock to trust reserving life estate was a gift, not a sale with
annuity as consideration).
159. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930). See also Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
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never regarded 'the simple expedient of drawing up papers' as controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to

the contrary." 16e0 Substance, not form, is controlling in determining
property ownership. 6'

Nonetheless, property ownership often is found by resort to state
law. "The federal revenue interest ... consists entirely of the expectation that the . . . rights will be determined accurately in accordance with the prevailing state rules."' 6 2 When Congress drafted the

tax code, it did not intend to redefine whole areas of legal relation-

ships created by state property law.'6 3 Instead, where Congress has
legislated that tax consequences depend upon "primary legal relationships," state law has controlled.6 4 Therefore, in the area of prop-

erty law, the tax authority has usually turned on state law
classifications with certain exceptions.' 65 This result appears rational
66
since the parties expect state law relationships to bind them.
C. Applying These Principles
A detailed examination into an exhaustive listing of tax areas

where state law has significance is beyond the scope of this Com-

ment. However, briefly exploring some principle areas where the

courts turn to state law can offer insight into our analysis of Roemer.1 7 By introducing the fundamental concepts underlying these

"state-controlled"

areas of tax law, perhaps the inconsistencies

above"" can be reconciled.

The use of state law to define personal injury damages is distinguishable from the examples that follow. The reasons for using state

law in these situations vary, and perhaps many of these could be
160. Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 573 (quoting Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S.
280, 291 (1946)). "In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are
concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly
binding." Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939).
161. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 828. See also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940).
162. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 474 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163. Ernest & Mary Hayward Weir Found. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 928,
932 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affid, 508 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
164. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1352.
165. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
166. For example, if the state determines that X is the owner of Blackacre, a judicial determination that Y is the owner for income tax purposes may confuse and unfairly
hinder the state's substantive law and its enforcement.
167. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
168. See supra notes 110-42 and accompanying text.

argued in favor of using some aspect of state law to define personal
injury damages. This Comment does not argue that state law has no

utility in section 104(a)(2) exclusion analysis. Rather, turning solely
to state law "labels" is something discouraged even in those areas of

law where state law dominates. It is hoped that by analyzing these
areas and their exceptions, the problems surrounding the use of state

law in defining personal injuries for federal income tax exclusion will
appear more obvious and troublesome.
1. Casualty Losses

Section 165(c)(3) of the I.R.C. allows the taxpayer to deduct
"losses of property . . . if such losses arise from fire . . . or other
casualty, or from theft."' 16 9 However, the Code does not define

"theft."' 170 The applicable treasury regulation17 1 states that theft in12
cludes, but is not limited to, larceny, embezzlement, and robbery.

The courts have allowed "theft" to include the taking of property
which is 173
illegal under the criminal law of the state where the loss

occurred.
The law. of the jurisdiction is applicable in determining a theft
within the meaning of section 165(c)(3) . 74 This is true even if the
alleged theft is not prosecuted.'1 5 However, "theft" requires a criminal act.' 7 6 The nature of the crime is irrelevant, as long as a theft
occurs. 1 77 But whether a theft occurs depends upon the law of the
78
jurisdiction where the loss is sustained.
The Fifth Circuit referred to the courts' resort to state law as a
rule of convenience only.' 79 In Bagur v. Commissioner, the Fifth
Circuit determined theft loss under federal law.' 80 The court stated
169. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1991).
170. Id. See Krahmer v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 49, 52 (1985), affd in part,rev'd
in part, 810 F.2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (as amended in 1964).
172. Id.
173. Rassa v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D. Md. 1986). See also Bagur
v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1979).
174. See Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 435 (1985); Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956); Montelone v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 688 (1960);
Vietzke v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 504 (1961); Norton v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 500
(1963), affid, 333 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1964); Curtis Gallery & Library v. United States,
241 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Gerstell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 161 (1966); Skolnik v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1055 (1971); Bellis v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 354 (1973),
aff'd, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1976).
175. Carlisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1428, 1430 (1976).
176. Buck v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 147, 149 (1967).
177. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
178. Muncie v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 849, 851 (1952).
179. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 1979), rem'g 66 T.C.
817 (1976)(where husband allegedly appropriated community income while wife was liable for taxes on her half).
180. 603 F.2d at 502.
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that the question was not "whether the taxpayer's husband should be
punished as a thief under state law but whether the taxpayer should
be allowed a tax loss as the victim of a theft under the federal tax
law." '' The Commissioner conceded that a loss may have been realized, but argued that it could not be classified as a theft loss because
Louisiana community property law made a theft by a husband impossible.18 2 The Fifth Circuit, unpersuaded by the Commissioner's
argument (and perhaps motivated
by equitable principles), found the
83
issue a matter of federal law.'
In the area of "other casualty" losses,"'8 courts appear concerned
with proof of loss.' 8 5 Events giving rise to the loss must be "sudden,

unexpected, violent and not due to deliberate or willful actions."'8

By requiring sudden, nondeliberate acts, the courts seem to address

the concern of fraudulent loss claims. The area of casualty losses
under section 165(c)(3)187 is one area where the courts and the IRS
have traditionally turned to state law, even though uniformity in the
taxation of individuals may suffer. "Because the elements of theft
vary with the criminal statutes of each state, the question of whether
a theft loss has been sustained is determined by reference to the

criminal law of the jurisdiction where the loss occurred.",8

When

the result of defining "theft" using state law seems inequitable or
against the intent of Congress, the courts may create an exception

and use federal law. 8 9 The readily apparent rationale seems to focus
on the position the IRS has taken with regard to Treasury Regula-

tion section 1.165-8(d),

90

proof of loss,' 9' or necessity. 92

181. Id. (emphasis omitted).
182. Id. at 501.
183. Id. at 502.
184. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Kielts v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 238 (1981) (disappearance of diamond from ring mounting held deductible under section 165(c)(3));
Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (proof of forged signatures on
fake paintings insufficient).
186. White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 433-34 (1967).
187. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1991).
188. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F,2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1979). See also
Montelone v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960).
189. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 170, 188 and accompanying text.

2. Marital Status

Certain sections of the Code directly address marital status and

the accompanying definitions. 193 Where the Code is silent, a federal

court is presumably bound by state law when determining marital
status. 94 In these situations, the Tax Court has consistently held

that marital status is defined by state law. 95 "Marriage, its existence and dissolution, is particularly within the province of the
states."' 96 Likewise, whether a party is legally separated depends
upon the state law of that party's marital domicile. 9 7 Termination of
marital status under an interlocutory decree of divorce is dependent
upon state law. 198
In many cases, the IRS has supported the courts' view and stated
that the marital status as determined by state law would be recog-

nized for federal income tax purposes.' 99 The IRS has also held that
a common-law marriage is recognized for tax purposes if recognized

by the state where entered
into.20 0 However, the IRS will not recog20

nize "sham divorces."1 '

Cases arising due to the "marriage penalty" 20 2 have often involved

an exception to the use of state law. For instance, in Boyter v. Commissioner,203 the Fourth Circuit held that the "sham transaction
193. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1, 2, 62, 63, 71, 151, 152, 153, 682, 2516, 6013,
7701(a)(17), 7703 (1991).
194. Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049, affd per curiam, 208 F.2d 796 (4th
Cir. 1953).
195. See Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1975), affd, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir.
1977); Gersten v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 756 (1957), affd in relevant part, 267 F.2d
195 (9th Cir. 1959); Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049, affid per curiam, 208 F.2d
796 (4th Cir. 1953); Calhoun v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 115 (1956); Estate of Buckley v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 664 (1962).
196. Eccles, 19 T.C. at 1051.
197. See Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978), affd, 602 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1979)(under New Jersey law, a separate maintenance decree does not create a legal
separation); Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 361 (1978)(holding a Wisconsin order for
temporary alimony, child support, and debt payments does not constitute a legal
separation).
198. See Eccles, 19 T.C. at 1049; Commissioner v. Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953),
affid, 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1954); Lane v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 405 (1956). See
also Commissioner v. Ostler, 237 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Holcomb,
237 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1956).
199. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
200. Id. See also Von Tersch v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 415 (1967); Amaro v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 914, 916 (1970).
201. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. "Sham divorces" are typically those yearend divorces (followed by remarriage) entered into solely for the purpose of enabling the
parties to file separate, unmarried tax returns.
202. The marriage penalty can be generally described as the higher taxes a married couple pays as compared with single taxpayers. For further discussion, see Wendy C.
Gerzog, The MarriagePenalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L, REv.
27 (1978). See also Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 957 (1983) ("marriage penalty" not a violation of any constitutional right).
203. Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981), rem'g 74 T.C. 989
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doctrine"2 0 4 may apply in this case involving a year-end divorce and
subsequent remarriage.2 °5 The Fourth Circuit determined that a federal question still existed and should be decided before resort to state
law and how that law affects the questioned divorce.20 6 This holding
supports the notion that the courts will resort to state law only after
the statute and federal law questions have been exhausted.
In a different situation, the Second Circuit in Borax v. Commissioner20 7 allowed a deduction for alimony payments made under a
settlement agreement even though the New York courts held the divorce invalid. 20 This case also suggests that state law will not always
determine marital status for federal income tax purposes.
Marital status definition within the context of the federal income
tax does not present the only situation where federal courts resort to
state law for definitions concerning domestic relations. The focus on
state law when defining classes within a federal statute has its primary roots in a 1916 Supreme Court decision.20 9 In Seaboard Air
Line Railway v. Kenney, the Court had to decide how "next of kin"
was defined.2 10 The Supreme Court stated,
[A]s speaking generally under our dual system of government, who are next
of kin is determined by the legislation of the various states to whose authority that subject is normally committed, it would seem to be clear that the
absence of a definition in the act of Congress plainly indicates
the purpose
211
of Congress to leave . . . that question to the state law.

The Court, unpersuaded by an argument for a common law definition, stated,
[T]he contention amounts to saying that Congress.. . must be assumed to
have overthrown the local laws of the States, and substituted another law
for it, when . . . it is clear that no such extreme result could possibly be
attributed to the act of Congress without 2express
and unambiguous provi12
sions rendering such conclusion necessary.
(1980).
204. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The IRS had previously declared that "sham divorces" would not be recognized. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40.
205. Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1388. See also Note, The Haitian Vacation: The Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1332 (1979).
206. Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1385.
207. Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
935 (1966) (alimony payments deductible despite New York ruling that Mexican divorce
was invalid).
208. Id.
209. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916)(state law determines
who are "next of kin" within meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)).
210. Id. at 493. "Plainly the statute contains no definition of who are to constitute
the next of kin to whom a right of recovery is granted." Id.
211. Id. at 493-94.
212. Id. at 494.

The Supreme Court also used state law to determine the definition
' In De Sylva v. Ballentine, the Court stated, "[t]he
of "children." 213
scope of a federal right is

. .

.a federal question, but that does not

mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than
federal law."121 4 The Court went on to hold, "This is especially true
where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal
law of domestic
relations, which is primarily a matter of state
215
concern."
In matters of familial relationship definition, the courts will look
to state law. "To provide a federal tax law of marriage would create
greater confusion in divorce courts than now exists. Some individuals
would be validly married for all purposes except federal taxes, and
others validly married for federal tax purposes only. Marriage is peculiarly a creature of state law .. ,,.'I
Where Congress has failed

to provide definitions of marital status, the courts usually turn to
state law.217 This appears rational since Congress has provided definitions in specific instances.21 Utilizing state law when the statute is
silent seems supportable considering the state-law nature of domestic
relations.
3.

Corporate Existence

A corporation under the Code, as defined in section 7701(a)(3) of
the I.R.C.219 includes "associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies. "1220 When interpreting section 7701(a)(3), state
law is normally determinative.221
One of the leading cases on corporate existence is Morrissey v.
213. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)(state law determines whether an
individual qualifies under "children" in federal copyright statute). See also Murphy v.
Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 808-11 (5th Cir. 1969)(meaning of "children" in the
Jones Act determined by state law).
214. 351 U.S. at 580.
215. Id. The Court qualified its comments by stating it would not follow a state
classification "entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage . . . ." Id. at 581.
216. Lee v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1201, 1202 (9th Cir. 1977).
217. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
219. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1991).
220. Id.
221. See O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding professional business organization incorporated under Ohio law was corporation for federal
income tax purposes); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (unincorporated association of doctors was corporation for federal income tax purposes); Larson
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (limited partnership under California law was
partnership for federal income tax purposes). But see Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485
U.S. 340 (1988) (holding that corporation's shareholders allowed losses sustained by entity when corporation was shareholders' agent and used to avoid state's usuary law).
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Commissioner.222 There, the Supreme Court set out the salient fea-

tures of a corporate organization for federal income tax purposes.2 2 3

The court in United States v. Kintner224 relied on Morrissey'2 when
it found an association of doctors was taxable as a corporation. 22 6

The court in Larson v. Commissioner22 also turned to the Morrissey
factors 22 8 when it found a limited partnership organized under Cali-

fornia was taxable as a partnership.229

23
2 30
The court in O'Neill v. United States held that Morrissey '

was not controlling there, since Morrissey232 involved the classification of a trust.2z 3 The Sixth Circuit stated, "The inquiry is whether
the state granted existence to a corporate entity under its law. 234
"It appears clear that the corporate entity created by state law is the
corporation taxed under the Internal Revenue Code. ' 2 5 The Sixth
Circuit went on to hold that a professional business organization incorporated under state law was a corporation within the meaning of
section 7701(a)(3). 216 The IRS has supported this view by promulgating Revenue Ruling 70-101237 and stating that "professional service organizations formed under state professional association or
222. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) (holding trustees of an express trust were an association).
223. Id. at 359. "A corporation, as an entity, holds the title to the property embarked in the corporate undertaking .... Corporate organization furnishes the opportunity for a centralized management through representatives of the members of the
corporation." Id. The interests of the corporation's members may be secure from termination or interruption by the death of owners. Id. The organization "facilitates ... the
transfer of beneficial interests without affecting the continuity of the enterprise, and also
the introduction of large numbers of participants." Id. Personal liability of the participants is limited. Id.
224. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
225. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
226. See generally United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). The
history of professional corporations is detailed, but interesting. See generally Lester B.
Snyder & Donald T. Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations,Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax
Relief for ProfessionalPersons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963) (discussing Kintner, the
IRS reaction, and other historical developments).
227. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
228. See supra notes 222, 223 and accompanying text.
229. Larson, 66 T.C. at 172.
230. O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
231. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
232. Id.
233. O'Neill, 410 F.2d at 890.
234. Id. at 898. But cf Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969)
(where professional corporation issue was analyzed without regard to state law label).
235. O'Neill, 410 F.2d at 896.
236. Id. at 899. For further discussion on professional corporations, see Snyder &
Weckstein, supra note 226.
237. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278, amplified by Rev. Rul. 70-455, 1970-2

corporation3 8statutes will generally be treated as corporations for tax
'
purposes. 1

Exceptions to the general rule do exist. "Whether an organization
is to be taxed as a corporation under the Code is determined by Federal, not state, law. '2 39 It is often necessary to ignore state labels and
analyze the underlying legal relationships.240 An agency relationship
may be recognized by focusing on the transactions at issue.241 In addition, corporate characteristics may be obtained by contract without
filing any articles of incorporation.242
Corporate existence, as opposed to partnership classification,2 43

can have dramatic tax consequences due to the "double taxation" of
corporate dividends and corporate tax deductions.244 Accordingly,
depending on the taxpayer's position at issue, corporate form may or
may not be desirable. Yet, the title a business holds under state law

will not always determine what legal tax consequences follow. 2 49 A
state law partnership may be taxed as a corporation.246

Corporate existence represents one area where the courts usually
resort to state law, 247 with some exceptions. 248 One explanation for
the exceptions is that the state label is not a reliable indicator of the
legal and economic consequences of the organization. 249 Another is
C.B. 297; Rev. Rul. 72-468, 1972-2 C.B. 647; Rev. Rul. 74-439, 1974-2 C.B. 405; Rev.
Rul. 82-212, 1982-2 C.B. 401, modified by Rev. Ru!. 73-596, 1973-2 C.B. 424.
238. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278.
239. Ochs v. United States, 305 F.2d 844, 847 (Cl. Ct. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 968 (1963). See also Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
"Neither the conception of unincorporated associations prevailing under the local law,
nor the relation ... to its shareholders, nor ... to outsiders, is of legal significance as
bearing upon the power of Congress to determine how and at what rate the income of the
joint enterprise shall be taxed." Id. at 114.
240. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 358 (1935).
241. See Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
242. States create legal corporations by requiring articles of incorporation to be
filed with the state's Secretary of State. A corporation is "an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. 518, 636 (4 Wheat. 1819). For a discussion on the contract theory of corporations, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989).
243. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1991). "The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within
the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation .... Id.
244. See Peter L. Faber, Taxation of Corporationsand Shareholders; Premises of
the Present System, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 5 (1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Corporate
IntegrationProposals and ACRS, 22 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 325 (1985).
245. See Edmond N. Cahn, Federal Taxation and Private Law, 44 COLUM L.
REv. 669, 702 (1944).
246. Compare Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (unincorporated joint stock companies taxed as corporations) with Larson v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 159 (1976) (state limited partnership taxed as a partnership under the Code).
247. See supra notes 219-38 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
249. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1353.
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that the courts value substance over form.2 50 Whatever the dominant
reasons, corporate existence
serves as a useful analogy to marital sta25 2
tus251 and casualty losses.
D. A Non-Tax Issue: Jury Instructions on Damage Awards
At this point, a brief departure from federal income taxation issues is welcomed. As discussed above, federal courts often consider
state law when deciding federal income tax decisions. 253 State courts
also consider federal income tax issues, but in a different context.
Perhaps the most familiar area of law is that involving jury
instructions.
Personal injury awards and settlements are excluded from gross
income for federal income tax purposes.25 4 Often, defendants seek to

have juries informed of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion in figuring
damage awards. Courts are in conflict as to whether the jury should
be so instructed.25 5 Irrespective of whether such an instruction is
proper or not, jurisdictions do vary in their treatment of jury instruction requests on the tax consequences of personal injury damage
awards.
25
The Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt "
held that it was error to exclude defense evidence pertaining to in-

come tax consequences and, when requested by the defense, a jury
250. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 594 (1943); Deputy v. duPont, 308
U.S. 488, 496 (1940). See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 169-92 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 167-248 and accompanying text.
254. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991). See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
255. Compare Losey v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 792 F.2d 58,
61-62 (6th Cir. 1986)(no jury instruction on tax exemption); Kennett v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 1977)(jury not to consider tax consequences of wrongful
death award); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 407, 522 P.2d
596, 602 (1974) (no jury instruction) with Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d
1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1974)(not reversible error to instruct jury on tax consequences);
Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. Cal. 1960)(jury instruction within trial judge's discretion); Fox v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 565,
570-71, 184 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1982) (jury instruction proper, but refusal not error). See
generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Actions, 16 A.L.R. 4th 589
(1982 & Supp. 1991).
256. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980), rev'g 378
N.E.2d 1232 (Ill. 1979) (wrongful death action brought under FELA requires instruction upon defense request).

instruction should be given.25 This decision may be limited to Federal Employer Liability Act actions. 25 8 The Seventh Circuit has held
that Liepelt259 does not control in cases involving purely state law. 2 0
Currently, this is a very unsettled and developing area of law.2' 6

Some states refuse to give the instruction fearing that if the jury
mitigated damages because of the income tax exemption, the plain-

tiff would not receive the tax benefits intended by Congress. 6 2 One
court allowed the instruction when the impact of future taxes was
substantial. 6 Of course, jury instructions have relevance in either
the federal or state court action,26 4 but only an attenuated impact in
the actual tax litigation itself, where the issue involves solely the taxation of damages received.265 However, uniformity of federal income
tax treatment will not be achieved if some courts require the jury
instructions, some allow it, and still others prohibit it. In the current
state of affairs, whether a party is granted the instruction will depend upon the forum chosen,266 the action filed, 67 or both.
IV. REASONS

FOR THE EXCLUSION

A discussion of section 104(a)(2) 268 would be incomplete without
mention of the purposes and policy behind the exclusion. Numerous

257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Tonarelli v. Gibbons, 460 N.E.2d 464
(Ill. 1984).
259. 444 U.S. at 490.
260.' In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago v. Commissioner, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983).
261. For detailed analyses, see Thomas W. Long, Economic Impairment in Personal Injury Actions, 30 S. TEx. L. REv. 397 (1989); Lorraine Stacknowitz Boss, Note,
Taxation and Personal Injury Awards: The Search for Workable Guidelines, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 628 (1988); Randall G. Vaughan, Comment, Tax Issues of Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death Awards, 19 TULSA L.J. 702 (1984); Lawrence A. Frolik, The
Convergence of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and
Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy "Derailed," 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565 (1983).
'262. See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. 1955).
263. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1044 (1968).
264. Jury instructions are procedural, subject to state or federal procedural law as
applicable in each case.
265. The Tax Court considers whether the award granted is taxed or not, not how
much the award should be, nor how the award was arrived at.
266. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
268. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991).
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commentators have struggled with identifying this policy.269 The leg-

islative history behind section 104(a)(2) and its predecessors has offered little guidance.17 0 Nonetheless, to fully understand the

significance of turning to state law as in Roemer,

1

the exclusion

policy remains quite important. For purposes of this Comment, mention of the offered theories will be helpful without conducting a thorough re-examination.

Most commentators have concluded that the exclusion is based on

humanitarian grounds.2

72 This theory suggests that the exclusion is a
matter of public policy.27 3 This explanation has been referred to as
"Suffered-Enough" concept. " Professor Harnett, the pioneer of

the

the "Suffered-Enough" concept, explained that "the taxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is
more to be pitied rather than taxed. 1 7 5 This "Suffered-Enough"

concept has received
some acceptance in the courts for explaining
27 6
the exclusion.
Several other explanations have been developed, though each has
its own limitations.17 7 Perhaps the most familiar is the "Return of

Capital" justification.2 78 The "Return of Capital" concept centers on
the idea of "being made whole." 279 The basic idea is that the plain-

tiff, having suffered a loss or injury, is just being returned to the preaccident condition. Two obvious problems with this rationale surface.

269. See Robert J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of
PersonalInjury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REV. 701 (1986); Bertram Harnett, Torts and
Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 614 (1952); Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax
and Non-Tax Policy Considerations,62 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 706-09 (1977); Mark W.
Cochran, Should PersonalInjury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
43 (1987) (arguing that they should not).
270. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
272. Timothy R. Palmer, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2) and the
Exclusion of PersonalInjury Damages:A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83, 86
(1989).
273. See Harnett, supra note 269, at 626-27 (concluding the exclusion is founded
on "emotional and traditional" factors).
274. See Schabes, supra note 8, at 226 (referring to Harnett, supra note 269, at
627).
275. Harnett, supra note 269, at 627.
276. See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th
Cir. 1983).
277. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
278. See Cochran, supra note 269, at 45.
279. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955).

First, the "Return of Capital" approach necessarily involves an element of "human capital" of which the taxpayer has no readily discernable basis.280 Second, often the taxpayer is compensated for lost
future earnings and pain and suffering. Besides being made whole,
the plaintiff is also awarded punitive damages in many instances,
often with no tax consequences. 28 '
One further justification is that the plaintiff should not be taxed
for an involuntary conversion. 2 ' This explanation has two serious
flaws.283 The most obvious and significant flaw is that section
104(a)(2) excludes personal injury awards completely, rather than
just deferring them.284 If Congress meant to exclude personal injury
awards as involuntary conversions, then section 103328' and section
104(a)(2)28 6 are inconsistent.

Other explanations, such as viewing damage awards as imputed
income 287 or as not derived from labor or capital, 288 have been struck
down as only partially applicable. 289 At this stage, perhaps the safest
and most consistent view is that Congress, in passing section
29 0
104(a)(2), sought to grant the exclusion for public policy reasons.
Whatever the justification or underlying rationale, tax exemptions do
depend upon legislative grace.2 9 ' I join the other commentators who
have concluded that humanitarian reasons are at the foundation of
the exclusion.29 2
V.

MESHING TAX POLICIES WITH THE EXCLUSION

Combining the policies behind the Code, the section 104(a)(2) exclusion, and the use of state law is a difficult but necessary task, as
280. I.R.C. § 1012 (1991) (basis of property shall be the cost of such property).
I.R.C. § 1001(a) provides that any return greater than basis is taxable gain. I.R.C.
§ 1001(a) (1991). The idea that human capital has no basis is questionable. See United
States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 850 (5th Cir. 1979) (dissent) ("it was not so obvious she
had no basis in the [blood plasma] sold"). See also Cochran, supra note 269, at 45-46.
Consider also that I.R.C. § 101 (providing that loss of life compensation is not taxable)
may indicate Congress recognizes value in human capital.
281. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
282. See Cochran, supra note 269, at 46-47 (referring to § 1033 which allows
deferral of tax).
283. Id. First, involuntary conversion does not exclude the gain, but rather defers
it. Second, § 1033 requires reinvestment in replacement property. Id.
284. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
285. I.R.C. § 1033 (1991).
286. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991).
287. See Cochran, supra note 269, at 48-49.
288. See Palmer, supra note 272, at 86.
289. See supra notes 287-88.
290. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
291. Luehrmann v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 10, 15 (8th Cir. 1961).
292. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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state law often does enter into federal tax court decisions.2 93 However, this Comment presents two approaches to the issue which logically explain how and when the use of state law is warranted.2 94
Under either analysis, the Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer ' 95 is
clearly questionable.
A.

The Eighth Circuit Test

In Doll v. Commissioner,29 the Eighth Circuit laid down useful
guidelines for determining whether Congress intended state law to
control in a tax statute. State law usually "determines the creation
and existence of legal relationships and their attendant rights, duties,
obligations and incidents. 29 7 Since state laws govern legal relationships, and the national revenue laws sometimes recognize them, the
court set out a useful approach for ascertaining when state law
applies. 298
The Eighth Circuit began with two general rules.299 First, the plenary power of Congress to tax is not subject to state control. 300 However, Congress may choose its own criteria and make or not make
state law control the application of its acts.30 '
The intention of Congress governs. 30 2 The Eighth Circuit
presented several factors useful in determining whether Congress intended state law to control.30 3 First, state law does not control unless
required by the express language of the statute or by necessary implication.3 °4 The second factor inquires whether a uniform application of a nationwide taxation scheme would be interfered with if
293. See supra notes 143-252 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 296-376 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
296. Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725
(1945).
297. Id. at 241.
298. Id. at 241-42. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit mentioned several factors to
be considered. Id.
299. Id. at 242.
300. Id. See also Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942); Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Farmers' Union
Co-op. Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 1937); Wholesalers' Adjustment
Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 156, 158 (8th Cir. 1937); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 72 F.2d 197, 200 (8th Cir. 1934).
301. Doll, 149 F.2d at 241-42.
302. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942).
303. Doll, 149 F.2d at 242.
304. Id. See also Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942); United States v.
Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402 (1941); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938). See supra
note 117 and accompanying text.

state law controlled. 30 Finally, the last inquiry involves whether the
purposes of the taxing act would be avoided by applying state law. 306
The court in Doll focused on the purpose test.307 In so doing, the
Eighth Circuit stated that "[s]ubstance and not form controls in applying income tax statutes ...."o8 The Eighth Circuit's tests, when
applied to the section 104(a)(2) exclusion, provide a coherent ap-

proach in analyzing the Ninth Circuit's use of state law to determine
a "personal injury."309

First, section 104(a)(2) does not expressly provide that state law
'311
controls. 310 Similarly, the Code does not define "personal injury. 312
It has been argued that Treasury Regulation section 1.104-1(c),
by use of the term "tort or tort type rights," 313 necessarily implies

that Congress intended section 104(a)(2) to depend "to some degree,
upon classifications under State law. '314 However, it appears that
the Ninth Circuit in Roemer relied solely on the state law classification, not just to some degree.3"5 The Ninth Circuit's necessary implication rationale hardly explains the fact that courts have successfully
applied the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) and its predecessors
without resort to state law classifications. 31 6
Second, using state law to define "personal injury" can interfere
with the application of a nationwide uniform tax scheme. 317 The
Ninth Circuit's use of California tort law to label defamation a personal injury may provide uniformity within the state, but uniformity

305. Doll, 149 F.2d at 242. See also Putnam's Estate v. Commissioner, 324 U.S.
393 (1945); Estate of Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1943); Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 48 (1939); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938);
Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 659 (1937); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110
(1932); Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 337 (1929); United States v. Childs, 266 U.S.
304, 309 (1924). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
306. Doll, 149 F.2d at 247 n.5.
307. Id. at 243.
308. Id. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 594 (1943); Moline Properties v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938);
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 213 (1920); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71
(1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 337 (1918).
309. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 4, 18 and accompanying text.
311. Id.
312. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
313. Id. "The term 'damages received'. . . means an amount received ... based
upon tort or tort type rights .... ." Id.
314. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1306 n.6 (1986).
315. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693, 697-700. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying
text.
316. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 305 and accompanying text; but cf.supra notes 169-92 and
accompanying text on casualty losses and notes 219-50 and accompanying text on corporate existence.
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even within the Ninth Circuit may not result.31s Various torts and
their state civil code classifications may or may not be uniform
throughout the nation. But, if two torts identical in nature are committed in separate states, the belief that Congress intended its section 104(a)(2) exclusion to rest upon state law labels is doubtful at
best, especially in light of the Tax Court's position prior to
Roemer.319

Third, the purposes of the exclusion could be defeated by applying
state law. 3 20 It is clear that section 104(a)(2) does not exclude business injuries from taxation. 321 Assuming a taxpayer can pigeon-hole
the injury into a state "personal injury" classification, 322 many business injuries could go untaxed because state courts awarded damages
in "personal injury-type" pleaded actions. The purpose of relieving
the pain under a "Suffered-Enough" concept 32 3 is stretched beyond
the clear intent of Congress in granting exclusion only to personal
injuries. The intent of Congress must ultimately control.324
Since the dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of
income, 325 any efforts by the courts to expand the exemption coverage should be suspect.326 Congress can choose to make state law determinative,327 but tax courts should
be hesitant to utilize the
"necessary implication" rationale 328 when doing so would interfere
with a uniform national tax scheme 329 and effectively defeat the purpose of the statute.330 Because such an exclusion derives from an act
of Congress, 33' the exclusion should be applied with congressional
intent in mind.332
Alternatively, state legislatures seldom, if ever, classify their tort
318. Perhaps another Ninth Circuit state does not offer a similar civil code
classification.
319. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
321. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1991).
322. The injury in Roemer itself, involving an insurance broker's reputation, certainly can fit this assumption. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 131, 138 and accompanying text.
325. Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239, 243 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
725 (1945).
326. Statutes authorizing tax exemptions should be narrowly construed. Deputy v.
duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 71 (1940).
327. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 306, 320-26 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 4, 291 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 137, 302-06 and accompanying text.

laws with federal income tax consequences considered. 333 With the
acceptance of the Ninth Circuit's approach, 334 this certainly could
change prospectively. However, because state tort law and federal
tax law do not pursue the same overall objectives, 335 using state law
to define a federal tax exclusion is inconsistent with federal policy.
B. FactorsInvolved in Choosing State Law: A Second Analysis
As a starting point, state law as used in tax court varies from state
law used in diversity cases.336 Under the Erie doctrine, 3 7 where the
substantive law is of state origin, state law furnishes the rule of decision.3 38 However, the federal income tax operates under federal substantive law. 339 Therefore, when concerning federal tax cases, federal
law applies unless Congress provides expressly or by necessary implication for the use of state law.340
Several factors help determine if state law should be used in the
absence of express provision.341 Among the most relevant are:
1) Do the tax consequences depend on the existence of a primary
legal relationship?
2) What is the feasibility of creating federal law definitions?
3) How difficult is ascertaining which state's law applies?
4) Would reliance on state34law
create nonuniformity among simi2
larly situated taxpayers?
Certainly, other factors come into play which may be helpful; but for
our purposes, these four questions present a useful guide in the comparison of "personal
injury" definition to the analogous areas of law
343
mentioned above.
333. The reason for California's two-tort system on defamation is not discussed,
but would certainly present an issue for future commentary. See supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
334. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
335. The common law of torts has two general purposes: 1) to deter conduct which
is contrary to public policy and harmful to society, and 2) to make the injured party
whole again. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of
income, while the purpose of the exclusion appears to be humanitarian in nature. Deterring wrongful conduct and reparation do not appear at the heart of § 104(a)(2). See
supra notes 269-92 and accompanying text.
336. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1351.
337. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 116, 125-27, 131 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
341. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1352-57.
342. Id. Certain revisions have been made to adapt these to our discussion of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
343. See supra notes 169-252 and accompanying text.
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1. Primary Legal Relationship

When applying a federal tax act, state law determines the nature
of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property. 44 When
drafting the Code, Congress did n6t intend to redefine whole areas of
legal relationships established by state law.345 In this regard, courts
usually turn to state law when property interests are involved.346
Likewise, when complex legal relationships are involved, such as
marriage, state law generally controls.341
The Ninth Circuit in Roemer used state law to define "personal
injury" for purposes of I.R.C. section 104(a)(2) exclusion.3 48 Had
the court faced the issue of property ownership,349 perhaps its resort
to state law would have been more supportable. But once Roemer's
ownership was
determined, state law (in property law terms) became
35 0
inoperative.
Certainly, the Ninth Circuit approach offers both convenience and
predictability. 35 1 However, if the Ninth Circuit's approach was fully
utilized, a defamed plaintiff in California could choose his cause of
action and benefit thereby. 352 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roemer involved a long, detailed analysis of California 35defa3
mation history-hardly a convenient alternative at the outset.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Roemer decision is its
lack of reliability concerning the resultant legal consequences. State
law classifications of legal relationships are best used for tax consequences when the "state label is a reliable indication of specific legal
and economic consequences. 354 Incident to this relationship are the
various rights, duties, and obligations that flow from the classification.355 Arguably for this reason, courts sometimes ignore state classifications of businesses for federal income tax purposes.3 56 When the
344. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940). See supra notes 131-33
and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 194-218 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
349. For example, were the injury damages property of Roemer for tax purposes?
350. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
351. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1353.
352. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693, 699. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
353. 716 F.2d at 697-99.
354. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1353.
355. Id. at 1352. See also Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir.
1945). See supra text accompanying note 297.
356. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.

state classification offers little assistance to understanding the underlying relation, its use should be inconclusive.3 67 The legal status "for
federal tax purposes need not be identical to their . . . legal effect
under state law."'3 58 The state law classification of an injury award
as "personal" suggests little about the rights, obligations, and consequences that flow from the classification.
2. Feasibility of Creating Federal Law Definitions
The definition of "theft" for casualty loss purposes is one area
where the feasibility of creating a federal law definition may be prohibitive.359 Not only is "theft" traditionally an element of criminal
law left to the states, creating a separate, all-encompassing definition
for federal tax purposes would be unduly burdensome on Congress.
Instead, the IRS and the courts have chosen to defer to state law in
lieu of a federal definition. 360
Defining "personal injury" for federal tax purposes, on the other
hand, is less burdensome and less infringing upon state autonomy.
Though Congress has chosen not to define "personal injury,"3 the
courts have functioned without resort to state law definitions before
Roemner.362 By focusing on "the nature of the claim,"3 3 courts have
been able to evaluate several factors before reaching a definitional
conclusion. State law classifications can be helpful, but making that
classification determinative cannot be based on the infeasibility of
creating a federal standard. 6 4
3. Ascertaining Which State's Law Applies
In most personal injury cases, the choice of law decision made at
the trial court level would suffice for tax definitional purposes as
well. Therefore, if use of federal law was based upon the difficulty of
state law choice, deferring to state law would not significantly lessen
the overall decisional burden. The choice of law question will always
exist at the state court level (assuming a state cause of action), and
its choice would bind the Tax Court in most cases. However, for
present purposes, this factor has little weight in the definition of
357. See Comment, supra note 139, at 1352.
358. Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1976). See
also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
359. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text. It is important to remember
that the courts' concern with losses under I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) also involve proof of loss.
See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 173, 178 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 4, 18 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
363. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693, 697. See supra notes 19, 26, 46, 57, 104 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.

I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2)

[VOL 29: 299, 1992]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

"personal injury" under section 104(a)(2).
A situation could arise where a particular state's law is unduly
restrictive or expansive, thus operating against the federal exclusion
policy. 3 5 Here, the ascertainment of which state law to apply could
become a significant issue. Yet, the ultimate choice of law question
would still be decided in a non-tax court arena and would always be
present.
4.

Uniformity

As stated by the Supreme Court in Burnet, "[iit is the will of
Congress which controls, and the expression of its will in legislation,
in the absence of language evidencing a different purpose, is to be
interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide
scheme of taxation."3866 When tax results vary for similarly situated
taxpayers, Congress must either expressly provide or necessarily imply otherwise.3 67 The intent of Congress provides for nationwide uniform application of the federal income tax.36 8
The strongest argument for use of state law in defining "personal
injury" under section 104(a)(2) of the I.R.C. is resort to the "necessary implication" requirement.3 69 As previously discussed, necessary
implication is a dubious explanation for state law usage in this context.37 ° In the absence of a necessary implication rationale, use 37of1
state law necessarily fails from promoting national inconsistency.
Differences in state law may not be read into the Code to spell out a
lack of uniformity.3 72 In interpreting an unclear statute, the Supreme Court defined its duty as "find[ing] that interpretation which
can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of
being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested. 3137 The scheme is that of uniform
nationwide tax treatment.3 74 The general purpose, though unclear,
365. See supra notes 3, 131, 268-92, 320-26 and accompanying text.
366. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, I10 (1932). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
368. 287 U.S. at 110. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 310-16 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
372. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930); In re Vaughan, 719 F.2d
196, 200 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927).
373. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (quoting NLRB v. Lion
Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)).
374. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

appears to be humanitarian in nature.37 5 Use of state law diminishes
congressional control over both, while it is clear federal tax law is
not subject to state control.376
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit took a big step in Roemer, a step that other
courts are likely, or required, 37 7 to follow. By resorting solely to state
law, the Ninth Circuit uniquely applied precedent to produce an outcome that may or may not have been correct. When the Ninth Circuit utilized California's classification of defamation to define
"personal injury," it effectively ignored or distinguished other precedent calling for federal law governance of federal income tax consequences and national uniformity.
Two arguments on the side of the Ninth Circuit's approach are: 1)
Congress necessarily implied the use of state law, and 2) "personal
injury" awards are property rights definable by state law. Ownership
interest was not at issue in Roemer; certainly, Roemer had property
rights in his damage award. Yet, once the ownership interest was
decided, state law became inoperative, and federal law was to determine how that interest was taxed under the federal income tax system. To say that Congress implied exclusive use of state law to
define "personal injury" is doubtful when viewed in terms of past
court treatment, IRS pronouncements, and the language of section
104(a)(2) itself.
"Personal injury" awards do not reflect primary legal relationships, such as marital status or property rights. Rather, a "personal
injury" award offers little to reliably indicate the underlying legal
relation and its attendant duties. Use of state court "labels" is suspect, especially when the result is variation of tax treatment and uncertainty of exclusion scope.
One additional problem with the use of state law is the federal
courts' problematic need to ascertain what that state law is. Most, if
not all, states have not addressed the classification of their torts in
terms of personal injury definition, especially as it relates to federal
income taxation. Certainly, confusion and unpredictability in the
Tax Court could result.
In Roemer, the Ninth Circuit took a short cut in its analysis of the
nature of the underlying claim of defamation. It will now be left to
Congress, the Supreme Court, or the Ninth Circuit itself to put the
375. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
376. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 109 (1932). See also Weiss v. Wiener, 279
U.S. 333, 337 (1929); Burk-Wagonner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925);
United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 309 (1924). See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 77.
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courts back on the right road. In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit's
approach will only add confusion, more uncertainty, and misguided
efforts in determining the nature of a claim seeking the generously
granted exclusion of "personal injury" awards from federal income
taxation.
WILLIAM
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